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II

MAREK S. SZCZEPAŃSKI

UPPER SILESIAN REGIONALISM IN THE SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS¹

The principal objective of the empirical studies reported in this article was to make a preliminary identification and reconstruction of the colloquial awareness of the native and incoming peoples as to the essence of regionalisation and also regionalism, and furthermore of their views of the possible effects resulting from the postulated administrative reform in Poland. Research of this kind has particular significance in regions of cultural borderlands, among which Silesia must certainly be accounted. The term "borderland region" refers to those parts of a country's territory, usually located on the periphery, in which there exists a clear consciousness of social difference, and the regional system of culture is the resultant of many years of interpermeation of numerous cultures and traditions of varied provenances. Such "marginal regions" over the course of the centuries changed their state affiliation and found themselves drawn into the sphere of influence of varied politico-administrative and also economic systems. As a consequence the population living in these lands have indeterminate nationality options, and national indifferentism is by no means a peripheral occurrence.

¹ Throughout the article use is made of the imprecise term "Upper Silesia". This lack of precision is due essentially to the fact that the historically shaped Upper Silesian region, placed almost entirely within the Polish border after World War II, includes considerable parts of the Katowice and Opole Provinces and also a slice of the Częstochowa Province. A large group of researchers also comprehend Cieszyn-Silesia as part of Upper Silesia, though currently lying within the borders of the Bielsko-Biała Province. Opponents of this demarcation point out, however, that Cieszyn-Silesia, after the Silesian wars, became part of the Habsburg monarchy and was drawn towards Galicia, while Upper Silesia formed part of the Prussian Kingdom and was drawn towards Wielkopolska (Great Poland — the Poznań region).

Upper Silesia constitutes a good example of a Polish borderland region. Over many centuries it has been subjected to the strong cultural, societal, political and economic forces coming from Bohemia and Moravia, from Austria, Prussia, Germany and Poland. Through the centuries Upper Silesia, and its various regions have changed their national status time and again, has been the place of contact or collision of many cultures, has found itself in the domain of influence of various political and economic systems. These historical determinants could not be expected to exert no influence on the present day shape and nature of Upper Silesia. For the borderland region is a territorial and socio-cultural unit in which is to be discerned the effects of long lasting historical, political, cultural, social and economic processes. In the area of Upper Silesia, the consequences of the chaotic urbanization and industrialization of the region organized by the Germans at the turn of the century are in existence and have their own dynamics. Today there are also functioning here, at least to a certain degree, and especially among the native people, historically constituted models of social mobility and professional advance and also elements of the shaping of a regional or local cultural ethos.

This borderland quality of Upper Silesia makes it a region of particular interest from the research point of view. The downfall of real socialism and the process of political liberalization in Poland have facilitated, or simply made possible, the undertaking of many sociological field studies. Hence regular investigations have been initiated or continued on the Silesian native population, the regional German minority, the conflict of cultures and also the regional consciousness.

The direct inspiration for the wider empirical investigation was provided by the result of pilot opinion polls carried out in Tychy between June 24th and July 2nd, 1992 on a relatively small example (sample No. N = 96; confidence level $d = 0.95$).² On the one side, the Tychy residents questioned declared that the crucial factor dividing and antagonising people in their town is the regional origin of the inhabitants, on the other hand, they stressed that the programmes of parties or political organizations upholding Upper Silesian regionalism and regionalisation concepts (Upper Silesian Union, Movement for Silesian Autonomy, German Minority Party, Liberal- Democratic Congress) were for them completely unknown (cf. Figs. 1, 2, and 3). However, they were aware of the programmes put forward by the parties unconditionally rejecting the concept of regionalisation of the country (National-Christian Alliance or not dealing at all with this problem matter (Polish Green Party).

² The poll was carried out by Grzegorz Brzęczek, diploma candidate of the Institute of Sociology, University of Silesia.




Fig. 1. What most divides Tychy residents? (pilot tests)




Fig. 2. Knowledge of programmes of political parties and organizations (pilot tests)

ZChN — Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe (Christian-National Union); UD — Unia Demokratyczna (Democratic Union); SLD — Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Wing Alliance); PPZ — Zieloni — Polska Partia Zielonych (Polish Green Party); KPN — Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej (Confederation of Independent Poland); KLD — Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny (Liberal-Democratic Congress); PC — Porozumienie Centrum (Centre Party League); "S" — Związek Zawodowy "Solidarność" ("Solidarity" Trade Union); Związek Górnośląski (Upper Silesian Union); Mniejszość Niemiecka (German Minority)




Fig. 3. Which party best represents the interests of the region? (pilot tests)

The choice of Tychy as the site for more profound empirical studies was by no means fortuitous. There are operating in the town local sections of the chief organizations of the Upper Silesian political scene (Upper Silesian Union and German Minority Party),³ while certain of their representatives hold important positions in the authorities. Moreover, the town itself, termed not too long ago "the socialist town", has a large Silesian population (about 30% of the total), but also a heterogeneous population of people from other parts.⁴ These specific factors, coupled with the interesting results obtained from a broader opinion poll, decided the ultimate choice of the place for conducting these studies.

Investigations were carried out between June and October, 1992 and involved 360 persons — selected on an intentional-quota basis — resident in three parts of the town differing in urban layout, architecture and social background (see Table 1).⁵ In the first of these, clearly standing out in the plan of Tychy as whole, is old quarter with old buildings situated near the brewery (Old Tychy)⁶

³ It may be mentioned that the leaders of the German Minority until quite recently maintained that the Tychy branch of their organization is one of the strongest — after Katowice, Chorzów and Bytom — in the Katowice Province.

⁴ Broader data on Tychy, social composition of the town, social and spatial structure may be found in M. S. Szczepański, *A "Socialist Town" and the Social World of Its Inhabitants*, Warszawa 1991, passim.

⁵ Academic and organizational supervision over the Tychy project was exercised by mgr Andrzej Tomeczek from the Institute of Sociology, University of Silesia.

⁶ In these studies were questioned residents of houses on the following streets: Sienkiewicza, Kościuszki, Miarki, Nowokościelnej, Norwida, Blachnickiego, Hlonda, Wieczorka, Damrota, Piwowarów, Zakątek.


Table 1

Tested population — basic statistical data

Feature	No. of persons	%
sex:		
men	180	50
women	180	50
age:		
18—35	180	50
36—60	180	50
territorial origin:		
Silesian	237	66
Nonsilesian	123	34
education:		
unfinished elementary and elementary	50	13.9
basic vocational	115	32.0
secondary	131	36.5
partial higher	21	5.8
higher	42	11.8
time of residence in Tychy:		
up to 1 year	8	2.2
from 1 to 10 years	37	10.3
from 11 to 20 years	99	27.5
from 21 to 30 years	81	22.5
from 31 to 40 years	65	18.1
from 41 to 50 years	34	9.4
more than 50 years	36	10.0

and the very earliest built settlement of the new town (Districts A and B).⁷ The second part of the town is a core of the New Tychy and here are consi-

⁷ Streets: 1 Maja, Lenina, Armii Czerwonej, Wojska Polskiego, Budowlanych, Barona, Gliniczańska.



MADE BY JERZY BIERWIACZONEK

Fig. 4. A map of the administrative division of Tychy

dered the complexes C,⁸ D,⁹ E,¹⁰ M,¹¹ N¹² and O.¹³ Finally the third part extends over the perimeter of the town and includes the village of Żwaków, incorporated in the town, new complexes of one-family houses¹⁴ sited near complex R, and complex R itself (see Fig. 4).

The questionnaire used in the poll contained three sections on particular themes, but due to the specific character of the present study only the replies relating to regionalism problem matter have been considered here. The second section dealt with the perception of crucial problems affecting the town and its inhabitants, while the third dealt with their ecological awareness.

Research results clearly indicated that the concept **regionalism** is only very shallowly embedded in the individual and community consciousness, and any attempt to define it proved to overstep the abilities, competence or inclinations of 94.0% of the respondents (338 persons). They all made use of the suggested answers printed in the questionnaire without attempting an independent description. Regionalism was most frequently taken to mean: *aiming to underline the different characters of various regions of Poland, such as Great Poland or Upper Silesia, or other regions* (30.1%: 102 persons). More rarely regionalism was defined as: *aiming to enliven cultural, scientific, academic life in the various regions of the country, such as Great Poland or Upper Silesia* (16.7%; 56 persons). Barely one twelfth of those questioned associate regionalism with *aiming towards political and economic independence for the various regions of Poland, such as great Poland or Upper Silesia* (8.2%; 28 persons). A large proportion of the respondents were unaware of the connotation of this concept (37.5%; 127 persons), and some had never heard of it. Yet one more group of those questioned refused to give any kind of answer (7.5%, 25 persons, see Fig. 5).

The remaining respondents (6%; 22 persons), who attempted of themselves to define the term **regionalism** gave a number of differentiated meanings, seeing this as being:¹⁵ *local patriotism; division of the country into language and cultural regions; the unique feature of regions, and their cultural values, traditions and language; partial economic autonomy of a given region; overture to regional chauvinism; feeling of affiliation with a region; self-determination of a region; everything that happens in our region and everything that affects Silesia; the nearest surrounding in which I live; a specific region; Silesia*

⁸ Streets: Curie-Skłodowskiej, Czysta, Cyganerii.

⁹ Streets: Dąbrowskiego, Darwina, Dębowa, Al. Niepodległości.

¹⁰ Street: Grota-Roweckiego.

¹¹ Streets: Młodzieżowa, Marchlewskiego, Marksa, Morcinka.

¹² Street: Nałkowskiej.

¹³ Street: Orzeszkowej.

¹⁴ Streets: Rękodzielnicza, Rydla, Zagrodowa, Regionalna, Chałupnicza.

¹⁵ I quote here the original replies of the respondents.




Fig. 5. What do the respondents understand by regionalism?

A — "Aiming to stress the different characters of the various regions of Poland, such as Great Poland or Upper Silesia, or other regions"; B — "Aiming to animate cultural, scientific, academic and economic life in various regions of the country, such as Great Poland or Upper Silesia"; C — "Aiming towards political and economic autonomy for the various regions of Poland, such as Great Poland or Upper Silesia?"; D — "I don't know this concept"; E — "No answer given"; F — Other — individualised — definitions of regionalism

or Mazovia; separating the incomers from the native peoples; making efforts towards ecological separateness; land belonging to a region; the territory lived in, culture, language, dialect, customs; a certain region, part of the whole; integration of people in some land; the atmosphere pertaining in some locality; a certain group of people, who have grown together and have a certain tradition; separating Silesia from Poland; attachment to a region where one was born; inequalities between the various regions of Poland; a person who cares for the conditions of the region in which he lives; irrational differences, attitudes (difficult to define) to the cultural and economic differences; the Silesian region, which is divided into Upper and Lower Silesia; a given region of the country, self-sufficient from which money — not a large sum — should be transferred to the national treasury.

The replies quoted well illustrate the differentiated scope of association invoked both in the individual and the communal consciousness by the term **regionalism**. On the one hand, it is linked with the **population community living in a certain territory**, on the other hand — with **a person caring about the conditions of a region**; once its positive connotations are pointed

out, and then again it is stressed that **regionalism constitutes an overture to chauvinism**.

In the judgement of the majority of tested persons, regionalism has its foundation in individualized and firmly consolidated *memories and sentiments associated with birth, growing-up or long-time residence in particular parts of the country* (62.7%; 225 persons). Only one in four of the Tychy residents questioned emphasized that the level of identification with a region depends above all on *a thorough knowledge of the culture of regions, their dialects, customs and ceremonies* (28.3%; 102 persons). The importance of *a deep knowledge of the history of particular regions, important historical events* in shaping "individual proregional attitudes" was indicated by merely 5.5%, that is 20 persons. The remaining respondents either plumped for the role of all these factors simultaneously (1.1%; 4 persons) or gave no reply at all (2.4%; 9 persons).

In the view of the majority of those questioned the varied regional origins of Tychy residents is the reason that they show different characteristics, in particular their different attitudes to **personal culture and the attitude to work**. A decidedly smaller role in differentiating people is thought to be political convictions and religious beliefs. Contrary to expectation different origin (Silesian versus non Silesian origin) did not have a significant place in these opinions; the differentiating role of personal culture and attitude to work was indicated to the same degree by native Silesians and incomers from various other parts of the country.

Results obtained from the pilot polls conducted, in particular the data which distinctly indicated the growing role of regional origins in creating social distances, prompted the formulation of questions on signs of intolerance in relations between the native Silesian population and the incomers from outside the region. It was recognized that **restrictive behaviour of Silesians (*hanysy*) towards people coming from outside the region (*gorole*) was decidedly more widespread and more frequent than of the incomers towards Silesians**.¹⁶ Cases of intolerance towards *gorole* (outsiders) had been met with by 38.9% of persons questioned (140 persons); 22.9% (82) had not found such cases in any situations, while 38.3% (138) refused to reply, stressing at the same time that they found the question drastic and controversial. It is noteworthy that those of the *hanysy* (Silesians) who had met with instances of intolerance towards incomers endeavoured to rationalize restrictive behaviour of this kind. They generally suggested that the problem here lay in the *low personal culture* of the incoming peoples and also their *duplicity*. In this sort

¹⁶ The social world of Upper Silesia is divisible only into two; as well as *gorole* and *hanysy* also distinguished are *krojcoki*. These include the children of mixed marriages "incomers" married to Upper Silesian men or women and even the children of *gorole* born in Silesia.

of way — by negative epithets and creation of stereotypes — ostracism against the “foreigners” was supposed to be justified. It was additionally emphasized that *after so many years of suffering discrimination against Silesians a phase of over-reaction and psychological catharsis is necessary.*

When questioned about instances of intolerance against *gorole*, respondents gave a great many examples, but most often indicated:¹⁷ *frequent abusive words applied to “gorole” (49 persons; i.e. 13.1% had met with this); vulgar behaviour towards “gorole”; invective, attacks and violence; public slandering; sneering at their non-Silesian origins; general hatred; frequent quarrels between Silesians and incomers; altercations; avoiding social contacts with “gorole”.*

Research also indicated, incidentally, the existence of: *Silesian racism; psychological prejudice; general discrimination against non-Silesians; feeling that the “gorole” who stole from the gardens of the native Tychy residents are responsible for conflicts, etc.*

Instances of intolerance towards Silesians by the *gorole* were reported by 26.1% of all the respondents (94 persons); that they had never met with such behaviour reported 38.6% (139 persons), while 35.3% avoided giving any reply, stating that the question was drastic and controversial. The most noticeable types of intolerant behaviour were said to be:¹⁸ *calling the Silesians hanysy (32 persons; 8.9%); rude remarks about Silesians dialect and customs; discrimination in the school of children speaking in the Silesian dialect; jeering at Silesians; treating Silesians as lower grade people; identifying Silesians as Germans; using physical force against Silesians, beating up Silesians; chicanery at work.*

Matter relating to mutual relations between the native peoples and the incomers — associated with serious but not dramatic conflicts — provided the starting point for a sequence of questions as to the perceptions of both those groups as regards the future status of Upper Silesia. *One in the three of those questioned was the opinion that Polish regions, and in particular Upper Silesia and Great Poland, should have economic independence (38.6%; 39; cf. Fig. 6). This kind of independence was most frequently associated with financial autonomy for the region together with keeping back and reinvesting of a considerable part of the income generated here.* The Tychy residents questioned on this matter were not in agreement, however, as to the proportion to be maintained between how much income should be contributed to the State Treasury and how much should be left at the disposal of the regional authorities. The most frequent proportion was that 50 to 90% of all income should remain in Silesia — that is substantially more than in the

¹⁷ I quote here excerpts from the original replies given by the respondents.

¹⁸ I quote here the original statements of the respondents.




Fig. 6. Should Silesia have economic autonomy?

inter-war period when Silesia contributed about 50% of its income to the state as laid down in the terms of the Organic Statute.

One in four of the respondents, however, were against economic autonomy, and the supporters of this view stressed that accepting this could serve as a pretext for completely ignoring *the financial problems of ruined by the Centre* (26.7%; 96 persons). Here again many people declined to reply (22.1%; 80 persons) or chose the indefinite variant — *difficult to say* (12.6%; 45 persons). It is noteworthy that questions dealing with the problems of autonomy aroused apprehension both among the better oriented and among those only intuitively associating this term with the regional revindication movements active in Silesia. It is possible that this apprehension was related to the deep founded conviction that public discussion on the economic or political status of Upper Silesia is contrary to Polish reasons of state. It cannot be ruled out that the cautious reactions of the tested persons are linked to the complex and tense political situation of the region in the latter half of 1992 (strikes in the mines, strike at the Car Factory in Tychy, activities of regional revindication movements, etc.).

These fears, although following the pilot polls, it was attempted to allay them via the local mass media coupled with help from the local church and authorities, are also reflected in the breakdown of answers to the next questions in the list, that in *In your opinion, should the Upper Silesian authorities aim to achieve widely understood autonomy?* As many as 36.9% of the respondents (133) declined to give a reply or chose the indecisive variant (13.7%: 49). One in four of the Tychy inhabitants thinks that efforts in this direction should be made in the nearest future (27.2%; 98), while one in

five considers that such projects should be completely discarded (22.2%; 80; see Fig. 7). Here it may be assumed with a large degree of probability that a considerable group among those avoiding a definite answer were really supporters of autonomy efforts, who for various reasons did not wish to reveal their views.




Fig. 7. Should Silesia aim for full autonomy?

The greatest apprehension among the respondents was aroused by questions dealing with political autonomy for Silesia; this was supported by only 3.5% (13 persons), principally from the autochthonic population. Considerably more numerous are the supporters of integral autonomy, under the control of the state and the central authorities, guaranteeing a certain economic (financial) and simultaneously political independence (24.4%; 88 persons). A solution of this type should allow the accelerated economic, ecological and physical-architectural degradation of the region to be halted. It is significant that a high 39.7% (143 persons) is of the opinion that during the period of real socialism — and especially during the nineteen seventies — Silesia was better treated by the central authorities than other regions of the country. It was stated that the previous authorities were interested in the region, arranged better supplies for the Silesian shops, let people earn better wages and favoured industry. The fall of this political formation brought a change in this favoured situation, and the only chance to restore this is by intraregional social mobilization, or alternatively arranging limited financial autonomy. For comparison, it should be added that 16.7% (60 persons) considers that in the past Silesia was treated by the central authorities the same as other regions; 19.7% (71 persons) consider that worse, while 23.9% (86 persons) did not reply. Those who voted for the option that Silesia was worse treated justified this usually by: Silesia was robbed of its money; was continuously exploited economically; the money

from Silesia went to Warsaw; Silesians were treated like work horses; a rapacious economy was practiced; Silesia was deprived culturally and robbed of any perspective for the future.

One in four of the respondents considered, at the same time, that the ecological, economic and urban-architectural degradation of Silesia is so severe that the critical point has been passed. In these circumstances even the greatest efforts by the regional community will not prove effective without appreciable economic assistance from central authorities and treating Silesia as a specially favoured region (24.4%; 88 persons). This point of view is well illustrated by the following statements: *Silesia brings in the greatest income, so it should get more money; Silesia is dying ecologically and must get more money for environmental protection some compensations is owing to us for having to live in such conditions; what the communists destroyed must be rebuilt; all the neglect in the area of culture, etc. must be made up for*, and so on. However, 21.6% (78 persons) from those questioned considers that Silesia should be treated the same as other regions, and that *the resources of the region will allow it to achieve emancipation.*

The results of the pilot tests and the fuller tests demonstrate clearly that regionalism, and even the problem matter of Silesian economy do not occupy a place at the forefront of the awareness of the tested persons, they are only indifferently verbalized and vaguely defined. In the case of Tychy — and possibly the whole region — attempts at legitimizing or rationalizing activities aimed at regionalisation by calling for the support of public opinion, must be recognized as politically corrupt. The residents of the town see this kind of political activity rather as *a fight to win key positions in the political establishment than as genuine efforts to resolve the actual problems of Upper Silesia.* They are convinced that the social gaps based on differences in regional origins (*hanysy — gorole*) are increasing dangerously, and that it is attempted to explain this escalation, at least in part, by pointing to the dramatic economic system in which the region finds itself. This intensifies the individual and collective neurasthenia, favours the formation of tensions and brings the danger of social upheavals in the town. The person questioned pointed out other problems in Silesia, apart from matters of autonomy, regionalism and regionalisation of the country, which require immediate solutions. Among these they mention elementary questions of everyday existence, such as: environmental protection, health protection or protection against unemployment and the lack of housing (see Fig. 8). Only incidentally, in two cases, the respondents suggested that resolving these crucial problems is not possible without Silesian autonomy (0.7%). What was considered to be substantially more important was the rapid influx of foreign capital, without which — in the opinion of 29.7% (107 persons) — development of the region is not feasible. For 20.0% of those questioned (72 persons), it is no matter




Fig. 8. Crucial problems of Silesia in the opinion of the respondents

from where this capital is transferred to Upper Silesia, though part of the population of Silesian origin stresses that this capital — for reasons of geographical and cultural proximity and the existing economic links — should most properly come from Germany (10.3%; 37 persons). Certain respondents felt, however, that it would be safer if this capital could be found from Western Europe as a whole (8.6%; 31) or even from distant Japan (1.9%; 7).

Anxiety about the elementary conditions of existence is accompanied, in the majority of cases, by declarations the respondents intend to remain in Silesia; only 14.7% (53 persons) want to leave the region or already taken steps towards doing so. It is an interesting point that for the group of would-be emigrants the desired goal is in ecologically uncontaminated areas — Masuria, Podhale, the Bieszczady region, more rarely to Germany or Austria.

*

The study presented here, in the intension of the author, was to fulfil an important cognitive aim. It was hoped that it would permit a reconstruction of the current views of the inhabitants of Silesia on the subject of regionalism and the postulated autonomy for this part of Poland. The text is based on broad ranking empirical investigations, of which a preliminary summary is given, carried out in Tychy between June and October, 1992 (No. 360).

From research results it may be concluded that the concept of **regionalism** has only very shallow roots in the individual and collective awareness, while a definition of their term is beyond the possibilities or competence or again the desire of the large majority of those questioned. They preferred to choose one of the ready formulated options rather than to attempt their own description. Regionalism was most frequently taken to signify: *attempting to emphasize the different characters of various regions of Poland, such as Wielkopolska (Great Poland, the Poznań region) or Upper Silesia, or other regions*. Those few who endeavoured to formulate their own, individual conception of the term "regionalism" presented numerous and differentiated definitions. On the one hand, they associated regionalism with *the population community living in a certain territorial region*, or on the other hand with *a person caring about the conditions of a region*; sometimes it is seen with a positive connotation while at another time it is stressed that *regionalism constitutes an overture to chauvinism*. A large number of those questioned were unaware of the connotations of this concept, while some had never heard of it.

In the opinion of the majority of the tested persons regionalism has its roots in individualized and profoundly embedded *memories and sentiments associated with being born, brought up or living for a long time in some particular part of the country*. More rarely it was stressed that the level of identification with a region is primarily governed by a profound *knowledge of the culture of regions, their dialects, customs and ceremonies*. The importance of a *deeper knowledge of the history of individual regions, significant historical events* in forming the "individual proregional attitudes" was also indicated by a small number of respondents.

The questions posed in one part of the questionnaire were aimed to elicit the commonly held views on the subject of the future status of Upper Silesia. One in three of those questioned stated that Polish region, and especially Upper Silesia and Great Poland, should have economic autonomy, usually coupled with financial autonomy, modelled on the inter-war period Organic Statute. However, one in four of the respondents was opposed to economic independence of this kind, stressing that such a legislative act could become a pretext for complete neglect of the *financial problems of Silesia ruined by the Centre*. The greatest disquiet among those questioned was aroused, however, by projects aiming towards political autonomy for Silesia, associated with separatist ambitions.

These presented results of empirical studies give clear evidence that regionalism, or the problems involved in the concept of autonomy for the region do not occupy a specially important position in the awareness of the respondents, they are unable to verbalize their opinions and any definitions tend to be inconclusive. In the case of Tychy, and very probably the whole region, any attempt to justify or rationalize attempts at regionalisation or

the grounds of support in public opinion, should be seen as political fraud. The truth is that the inhabitants of the town are to a very large extent pragmatically oriented and view this kind of political action rather as a struggle to gain the leading positions in the *regional political establishment*, than as attempt to solve the real problems of Upper Silesia. At the same time the persons questioned draw attention to other problems, apart from autonomy, regionalism and regionalisation of the country — urgent problems of Silesia which require speedy remedies (environmental protection, health protection, protection against unemployment and the housing deficit).

Marek S. Szczepański

REGIONALIZM GÓRNOŚLĄSKI W SPOŁECZNEJ ŚWIADOMOŚCI

Streszczenie

Przedstawione opracowanie miało spełniać — w autorskich zamierzeniach — ważny cel poznawczy, tj. pozwolić na rekonstrukcję potocznych wyobrażeń mieszkańców Śląska na temat regionalizmu i postulowanej autonomii tej części Polski. Tekst został oparty na wynikach stosunkowo rozległych — i wstępnie podsumowanych — badań empirycznych, przeprowadzonych w Tychach między czerwcem a październikiem 1992 roku (N = 360).

Relacjonowane badania empiryczne wyraźnie dowodzą, że **regionalizm** czy problemy autonomizacji regionu nie zajmują — w świadomości badanych — zbyt eksponowanego miejsca, są słabo przez nich werbalizowane i niejednoznacznie definiowane. W przypadku Tych — a być może całego regionu — za nadużycie polityczne należy uznać próby legitymizacji lub racjonalizacji działań zmierzających do autonomii regionalnej za pomocą odwołań do poparcia opinii publicznej. Mieszkańcy miasta są bowiem w przeważającej mierze zorientowani **pragmatycznie** i łączą ten typ działalności politycznej raczej z walką o kluczowe miejsca w regionalnym **establishmencie politycznym** aniżeli z **próbami rozwiązywania rzeczywistych problemów** Górnego Śląska. Ankietowani wskazują jednocześnie na inne — niż autonomia, regionalizm i regionalizacja kraju — problemy, które wymagają na Śląsku natychmiastowych rozwiązań (ochrona środowiska, ochrona zdrowia, ochrona przed bezrobociem i niedostatkiem mieszkań).

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OBERSCHLESISCHER REGIONALISMUS IM GESELLSCHAFTLICHEN BEWUßTSEIN

Zusammenfassung

Die dargelegte Bearbeitung sollte — im Vorhaben des Autors — ein wichtiges Erkenntnisziel erreichen, d.h. die Rekonstruktion der alltäglichen Vorstellungen der Einwohner Oberschlesiens zum Thema Regionalismus und angestrebte Autonomie dieses Teiles von Polen zu ermöglichen. Der Text fußt auf den Ergebnissen relativ umfangreicher — und vorresumierter — empirischer Untersuchungen, die zwischen Juli und Oktober 1992 in Tychy durchgeführt wurden. (N = 360).

Die beschriebenen empirischen Untersuchungen beweisen deutlich, daß **der Regionalismus** oder die Probleme der Autonomisierung der Region im Bewußtsein der Untersuchten keine gehobene Stellung einnehmen; sie werden schwach verbalisiert und nicht eindeutig definiert. Im Falle von Tychy — und vielleicht auch der ganzen Region — sollte man die Versuche der Legitimierung oder Rationalisierung von Tätigkeiten, die als Ziel die Autonomie der Region mit Hilfe des Zurückgreifens auf die öffentlichenmeinung haben als politischen Mißbrauch betrachten. Die Einwohner der Stadt sind vorwiegend **pragmatisch** orientiert und verbinden den Typ der politischen Tätigkeit vielmehr mit dem Kampf um die führende Position im regionalen, **politischen Establishment als mit dem Versuchen der Lösung der wirklichen Probleme** Oberschlesiens. Die Befragten deuten zugleich auf andere als die Autonomie, der Regionalismus und die Regionalisierung des Landes, Probleme, die in Oberschlesien sofort zu lösen sind (Umweltschutz, Gesundheitswesen, Arbeitslosigkeit, Wohnungsmangel).